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Francis Hutcheson is generally accepted as producing the first systematic study of 
aesthetics, in the first treatise of An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty 
and Virtue, initially published in 1725. His theory reflected the eighteenth century 
concern with beauty rather than art, and has drawn accusations of vagueness since the 
first critical response, by Charles Louis DeVillete in 1750. The most serious critique 
concerns the idea of beauty itself: whether it was simple or complex, and the idea of a 
primary or secondary quality. It is the latter question I shall answer, attempting to 
clarify the problematic passage that appears at the end of the first section of 
Hutcheson’s first treatise.       
 
I.        HUTCHESON’S THEORY OF BEAUTY 
Hutcheson began by recounting the operation of what he called the external senses, 
such as sight and hearing.1 He described the idea raised in the mind by an external 
object as a sensation, and our powers of perceiving those ideas as our senses. He 
noted that the ideas of corporeal substances comprised a variety of simple ideas and 
that complex ideas included perceptions of both types of qualities as specified by John 
Locke.   
                                                 
1
    Hutcheson (1738b), p.7-9. 
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Locke recognised the power to produce an idea as a quality of a body, and divided 
these qualities into primary and secondary.2 Primary qualities were distinguished by 
being inseparable from the bodies themselves, and produced simple ideas of: solidity, 
extension, figure, motion, number, and texture. In contrast, secondary qualities were 
not contained in the bodies, but were the effect of the primary qualities on the mind, 
producing simple ideas of: colour, smell, taste, and sound. 
Hutcheson remarked that the contemplation of the idea of most material objects 
produced either a pleasure or a pain,3 identified beauty with the former, and defined it: 
“the word beauty is taken for the idea raised in us, and a sense of beauty for our 
power of receiving this idea.”4 The power of perceiving beauty was an internal sense, 
and ‘beauty’ and ‘sense of beauty’ corresponded to the ‘sensation’ and ‘sense’ of the 
external senses.5 The internal sense was a superior power of perception to the external 
because it afforded greater pleasure, and the ideas of beauty were both necessarily 
pleasant and immediate.6   
Hutcheson distinguished between original and comparative beauty: the former was 
perceived without external comparisons (e.g., a work of nature); the latter was 
considered as a resemblance of something else (e.g., a painting of a natural scene).7  
Comparative beauty “is founded on a conformity, or a kind of unity between the 
original and the copy.”8 Thus there was no requirement of beauty in the original, 
merely that the imitation was accurate, although an imitation of original beauty would 
improve the whole. Hutcheson used the example of poetry to explain the interaction 
between the two types of beauty, suggesting that poets should not create characters 
that were too virtuous; while they might possess original beauty, imperfect characters 
are a more realistic portrayal of human beings, and thus the comparative beauty of the 
accurate characters outweighs the defects in their original beauty. 9   
Hutcheson proposed “uniformity amidst variety” as the primary quality that 
produced the idea of original beauty:   
 
                                                 
2
    Locke (1690), p.100-102. 
3
    Hutcheson (1738a), p.4. 
4
    Hutcheson (1738b), p.10.     
5
    Hutcheson was also concerned with the aural equivalents to the visual, namely harmony and a good 
ear. 
6
    Hutcheson (1738b), p.9-12. 
7
    Ibid, p.14. 
8
    Ibid, p.23. 
9
    Ibid, p.23-24. 
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[W]hat we call beautiful in objects, to speak in the mathematical style, seems to be a 
compound ratio of uniformity and variety: so that where the uniformity of bodies is equal, 
the beauty is as the variety; and where the variety is equal, the beauty is as the uniformity. 
This may seem probable and hold pretty generally.10 
 
He used several illustrations from geometry: a square is more beautiful than an 
equilateral triangle because it has greater variety (number of sides) in equal 
uniformity (equal length of sides); a square is also more beautiful than a rhombus, 
because it has greater uniformity (regularity) in equal variety (number of equal 
sides).11  Hutcheson understood how inclusive this general foundation of beauty was, 
and applied it to instances as diverse as architecture, gardening, nature (including 
animals), geometry, algebra, universal truths, history, dance, dress, and poetry. 
Despite the operation of this principle, however, humans experienced the pleasant 
sensations without knowing their exact cause.   
Hutcheson followed this exposition with a number of observations which have 
anticipated modern philosophical concerns, specifically animal consciousness and 
pluralism. He believed that humans could not judge any form in nature as having no 
beauty, as they did not understand the perceptive powers of animals12 and that 
although styles of architecture differ greatly between nations, they all display 
uniformity of the parts to each other, and the parts to the whole.13 Hutcheson 
summarised his theory as: “The internal sense is a passive power of receiving ideas of 
beauty from all objects in which there is uniformity amidst variety.”14 
 
II.          THE IDEA OF BEAUTY 
There is some dispute over whether Hutcheson actually based his aesthetics on 
Locke’s theory of perception, and, if so, whether he understood it.15 With regard to 
the former question, I shall take Hutcheson’s explicit reference to “Mr Locke”16 at 
face value; the answer to the latter will depend upon whether a satisfactory 
explanation of Hutcheson’s idea of beauty can be constructed in Lockean terms.    
                                                 
10
    Hutcheson (1738b), p.15. 
11
    Ibid, p.15-16. 
12
    Ibid, p.31 
13
    Ibid, p.22. 
14
    Ibid, p.36. 
15
    See Michael (1984), Korsmeyer (1979) and Kivy (2003). 
16
    Hutcheson (1738b), p.9. 
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The problem occurs in the following passage:    
 
Only let it be observed that by absolute or original beauty is not understood any quality 
supposed to be in the object which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any 
mind which perceives it. For beauty, like other names of sensible ideas, properly denotes 
the perception of some mind; so cold, hot, sweet, bitter, denote the sensations in our 
minds, to which perhaps there is no resemblance in the objects which excite these ideas in 
us, however we generally imagine otherwise. The ideas of beauty and harmony, being 
excited upon our perception of some primary quality, and having relation to figure and 
time, may indeed have a nearer resemblance to objects than these sensations, which seem 
not so much any pictures of objects as modifications of the perceiving mind; and yet, were 
there no mind with a sense of beauty to contemplate objects, I see not how they could be 
called beautiful.17   
 
It seems that beauty exhibits real existence and dependence upon the perceiver, and 
that the idea of beauty is therefore both the idea of both a primary quality and the idea 
of a secondary quality.     
Peter Kivy divides the passage into six separate claims, the first five of which are 
compatible with the idea of beauty as the idea of a secondary quality. The sixth 
suggests otherwise, however: 
 
The ideas of beauty and harmony, because they can be aroused by (the primary qualities 
of) figure and time, may resemble objective qualities somewhat more than ideas such as 
‘cold,’ ‘heat,’ ‘sweet,’ ‘bitter,’ which do not resemble any objective qualities at all.18 
 
Kivy identifies two reasons why the idea of beauty cannot be the idea of a primary 
quality. First, beauty is dependant upon a perceiving mind, whereas primary qualities 
exist independently of minds. Second, although Hutcheson describes the ideas of 
beauty as having a closer resemblance to the object than the idea in the perceiving 
mind, “this relation is not considered to be the strong relation of resemblance which 
holds between the ideas of primary qualities and the corresponding qualities 
themselves.”19  
                                                 
17
    Ibid, p.13-14. 
18
    Kivy (2003), p.51. 
19
    Ibid, p.51-52. 
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Kivy justifies his second point by referring to the fact that we can have an idea of 
the quality which causes our idea of beauty, i.e., uniformity amidst variety, whereas 
we cannot have an idea of the quality which causes our idea of, e.g., redness.20 He 
differentiates between Hutcheson’s speech to the learned and the vulgar by way of 
explanation.21 When addressing the learned, Hutcheson distinguishes between the 
quality of uniformity amidst variety in the object, and the two ideas it produces in the 
perceiver: the complex idea of (particular) uniformity amidst variety, which causes 
the simple idea of beauty. When addressing the vulgar, however, Hutcheson merely 
calls the object that produces the idea of beauty, beautiful, in the same non-rigorous 
way in which we might describe a rose as red, even though we knew the redness was 
merely the idea of a secondary quality and not a real quality in the object. Thus, when 
Hutcheson states that ideas of beauty may resemble the objects, he is referring to the 
primary quality of uniformity amidst variety that produces the idea of beauty, rather 
than the idea of beauty itself, i.e., he is speaking with the vulgar in saying that the 
object seems beautiful just as roses seem red.   
The suggestion that Hutcheson alternates between a learned and vulgar audience in 
a philosophical treatise is suspect, though Kivy’s interpretation of Hutcheson has 
merit. The nearer resemblance could indeed have been a reference to perceptible 
uniformity amidst variety, but Kivy sees such an answer as problematic since Locke 
insisted that the ideas of secondary qualities are produced by “the operations of 
insensible particles on our senses.”22 The primary qualities that produce the idea of 
the secondary quality of redness are, and must be, imperceptible to the person who 
sees the colour.23 The idea of beauty functions differently: although we are not 
required to be aware of the causal primary qualities in order to perceive the beauty, it 
is possible to look at a beautiful object, e.g., a work of art, and perceive the uniformity 
amidst variety in addition to the beauty.24 Kivy’s conclusion is that the idea of beauty 
is the idea of a secondary quality as defined by Berkeley, rather than Locke, and, as 
such, goes beyond the scope of my inquiry.25 
 
 
                                                 
20
    Ibid, p.62. 
21
    Ibid, p.61. 
22
    Locke (1690), p.102. 
23
    Kivy (2003), p.60. 
24
    I consider Kivy’s interpretation of Locke in more detail below. 
25
    Kivy (2003), p.60. 
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III.       THE IDEA OF A PRIMARY OR SECONDARY QUALITY? 
If we accept that Hutcheson’s idea of beauty must either be the idea of a primary or 
secondary quality in Lockean terms, then the evidence seems overwhelmingly in 
favour of it being the latter. If we adopt this position, however, we are required to 
explain the phrase may indeed have a nearer resemblance to objects than these 
sensations in the passage above. In mentioning the possibility that animals perceive 
beauty where humans do not, Hutcheson has already noted: “But our Inquiry is 
confined to men”;26 he subsequently also excludes the perception of Providence: 
 
[W]e need not inquire whether, to an almighty and all-knowing Being, there be any real 
excellence in regular forms, in acting by general laws, in knowing by general theorems. 
We seem scarce capable of answering such questions anyway.27 
 
If Providence experiences beauty in certain forms, laws, or theorems, then this would 
be real beauty, but Hutcheson was only concerned with the human experience.   
A potential answer to the puzzle is, therefore, as follows: as an astute philosopher, 
Hutcheson admitted the possibility that there may be other, zoological and divine, 
experiences of beauty beyond human understanding, and noted this when describing 
original beauty. The nearer resemblance is thus merely a passing reference to real 
excellence in the instance of Providence. Given the climate of religious persecution 
that existed at the time of his writing, Hutcheson may even have felt it necessary to 
include a reference to Providence in order to escape censure.28  
To accept this answer, a number of objections must be addressed. First, there is 
Kivy’s observation that the idea of beauty contains sensible particles in uniformity 
amidst variety, and is consequently precluded from Locke’s definition of the ideas of 
secondary qualities. In fact, closer attention to Locke seems to suggest that beauty can 
be neither a primary nor secondary quality: 
 
After the same manner that the ideas of these original [primary] qualities are produced in 
us, we may conceive that the ideas of secondary qualities are also produced, viz. by the 
operations of insensible particles on our senses.29        
                                                 
26
    Hutcheson (1738b), p.31. 
27
    Ibid, p.42. 
28
    Hutcheson was unsuccessfully prosecuted for his unorthodox religious views in 1737.  As of the 1st 
January 2010 convictions for blasphemy are punishable by a fine of up to €25 000 in his native Ireland.  
29
    Locke (1690), p.102. 
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Both primary and secondary qualities are produced by the insensible particles, and if 
uniformity amidst variety is a sensible particle of the idea of beauty, then beauty is not 
a quality at all. Kivy has misunderstood Locke, however, as the insensible particles in 
Locke’s theory of perception are his attempt to describe the method by which external 
objects produce ideas in our minds, i.e., the mechanics of perception. Thus, while 
uniformity amidst variety is perceptible by sight, it is still conveyed to the eyes by 
imperceptible bodies (the effect of light on the retina in contemporary language).30    
Kivy has raised a more convincing objection to the idea of beauty as the idea of a 
(Lockean) secondary quality in noting that, in the passage under discussion, 
Hutcheson clearly differentiates the idea of beauty from ideas like cold and sweet. 31 
There is a further potential objection to beauty as a secondary quality in the 
ambiguous phrase, having relation to figure and time. Hutcheson has already 
mentioned two relations, neither of which seem relevant in the context: beauty, like 
the ideas of all primary and secondary qualities, is causally related to primary 
qualities, and “has always a relation to the sense of some mind.”32 What, then, is this 
undisclosed relation?     
I suggest the relation would, in some unspecified way, support the subsequent 
claim of nearer resemblance, and thus provide evidence for the possibility of the real 
existence of beauty in an object. Unfortunately Hutcheson not only fails to expand 
upon his meaning, but also fails to mention this peculiar, particular relation again. 
Notwithstanding, we can at least conclude that Hutcheson may have believed that 
there was (some) evidence for beauty as a primary quality. If we reverse our 
interpretation of the quote, and accept that beauty is real, then we are required to 
account for the reference to beauty being dependent on the observer, which occurs 
three times in the quote and is reiterated throughout the treatise. The task seems 
daunting, but I believe an answer can be found in Peter Lamarque’s doomsday 
scenario.33   
 
 
 
                                                 
30
    Ibid, p.100-107. 
31
    Kivy (2003), p.58. 
32
    Hutcheson (1738b), p.14. 
33
    Lamarque (2002), p.155-157. 
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IV.  THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO 
In examining the survival conditions of works of art, Lamarque asks what becomes of 
them when all human beings are extinct. His answer is that they vanish: the material 
objects persist, but the works disappear. Thus, while the Mona Lisa remains on the 
wall of the Louvre, it is nothing more than a painted canvas in a frame. Lamarque 
nonetheless has a realist stance, stating:  
 
Works (of art) are real, not ideal, entities (they do not exist only in the minds of those who 
contemplate them); they are public and perceivable (they can be seen, heard, touched, as 
appropriate, and by different perceivers); they possess their properties objectively, some 
essential, some inessential.34 
 
Despite this real existence, there can be no art without human appreciation: “The 
continued existence of any work depends upon the possibility of the work’s being 
responded to in appropriate ways.”35 In the doomsday scenario, objects survive, but 
works of art do not. The significance of the doomsday scenario for my purpose is that 
Lamarque shows that the property of having real existence is not necessarily contrary 
to the property of being dependent upon a perceiver. Works of art are real, but art 
could not exist in the absence of human perception. 
Lamarque’s view is a consequence of establishing reception conditions as an 
essential property of an artwork, and he maintains that conditions of production and 
reception provide the necessary conditions for origin and survival respectively.36 The 
significance of reception conditions was first identified by Arthur Danto, who raised 
the problem of indiscernibility. Danto noted that the only difference between Andy 
Warhol’s Brillo Box sculpture and a box made by the Brillo company was “a certain 
theory of art.”37 The idea that the essence of art is contextual rather than intrinsic 
became known as the institutional theory of art, and has dominated analytic aesthetics 
since the nineteen-sixties.38 
                                                 
34
    Ibid, p.146. 
35
    Ibid, p.154. 
36
    Ibid, p.153. 
37
    Danto (1964), p.33. 
38
    Carroll (2000), p.14-15. 
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Hutcheson endorses a strictly anthropocentric view of beauty. I believe his position 
is analogous to Lamarque in the significance it accords to the human perception and 
response to beauty;39 the end of the quoted passage serves as one of many examples: 
“and yet, were there no mind with a sense of beauty to contemplate objects, I see not 
how they could be called beautiful.”40 If Hutcheson was similarly a realist with 
respect to the existence of beauty, then his claims about nearer resemblance and the 
differentiation from the ideas of secondary qualities would be explained.       
I propose a second answer as follows: Hutcheson believed that the idea of beauty 
was the idea of a primary quality, with real existence in the object, but he was 
anthropocentric to the extent that the type of beauty with which he was concerned 
could not exist without human response. Unlike secondary qualities, beauty exists in 
both human minds and the objects themselves; in the doomsday scenario the 
uniformity amidst variety remains, but it cannot be called beauty in any meaningful 
sense because of the lack of human response.  
 There are now two mutually exclusive ways to understand Hutcheson. Either the 
idea of beauty is the idea of a secondary quality, and the nearer resemblance is a 
reference to the possibility of the real excellence which would occur in the event of 
Providence perceiving beauty; or the idea of beauty is the idea of a primary quality, 
and the references to beauty being dependent on the perceiver are to the 
anthropocentric nature of the beauty with which Hutcheson was concerned. In order to 
make sense of Hutcheson, we must therefore choose between an answer that appeals 
either to a separate section of the Inquiry, or to a twenty-first century thought 
experiment. I shall show why the latter is the more appropriate, despite being counter-
intuitive.    
Hutcheson’s discussion of Providence appears at the end of the treatise on beauty, 
and his concern is with the final (divine) causes of the internal sense. The mention of 
‘real excellence’ is something of an aside, nothing more than an allusion:  
 
                                                 
39
    I am not suggesting that Hutcheson held an institutional view of beauty, merely that he recognised 
some intimate and necessary connection between humanity and beauty. 
40
    Hutcheson (1738b), p.14. 
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We seem scarce capable of answering such questions anyway; nor need we inquire 
whether other animals may not discern uniformity and regularity in objects which escape 
our observation, and may not perhaps have their senses constituted so as to perceive 
beauty from the same foundation which we do, in objects which our senses are not fit to 
examine or compare.41  
 
Hutcheson is not only indifferent to the perception of Providence, but takes the 
opportunity to reiterate his anthropocentrism. He is unequivocally concerned with the 
human sense of beauty, not the divine or animal. 
In the light of this somewhat offhand mention of real excellence, it seems unlikely 
that Hutcheson would refer to the perception of Providence when defining original 
beauty. It is much more likely that he had not considered the full implications of the 
anthropocentrism with which he opens and closes the passage in question. He may 
even have had some kind of doomsday or ‘Genesis’ scenario in mind, and failed to 
realise that the references to human perception would bring the existence of real 
beauty into question. It is worth noting that Hutcheson’s theory was unopposed in his 
lifetime,42 with the result that he did not enjoy the philosophical debate which would 
have drawn attention to his omissions and ambiguities.   
In conclusion, Hutcheson believed that the idea of beauty was the idea of a primary 
quality, and that beauty had real existence, but also that there could be no sense of 
beauty, and no beauty that made sense, in a world devoid of human perception. 
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    Hutcheson (1738b), p.42-43. 
42
    Aldridge (1948), p.169. 
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